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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Service of Process--Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
Three recent decisions, one by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit' and two by the North Carolina Supreme Court,2
focus attention on conflicting views concerning a foreign corporation's
amenability to suit in a state where it conducts some activities but is not
licensed to do business.3  The North Carolina General Assembly pro-
vided by statute for service of process on foreign corporations "not trans-
acting business in this State," but which engage in certain specified
activity.4 In two of the afore-mentioned decisions, the courts took a
restrictive view of state jurisdiction over such corporations and held
the statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of each case;, in the
third decision, the statute was upheld.0
An examination of these cases should perhaps be prefaced by a brief
consideration of the judicial history of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. The subject has not had constancy as one of its character-
istics. Originally, the view was taken that a corporation could be sued
only in the state that created it.7 This view was superseded by the "im-
plied consent" theory,8 which in turn was replaced by the "presence"
theory.9 Actually, these last two theories relied on the same criterion,
viz., whether or not the corporation was "doing business" in the state.
Since a state has power to keep a foreign corporation out,' 0 when the
corporation entered the state its "implied consent" to be sued therein was
' Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
'Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957) aiid
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).
'No difficulty arises in situations in which a foreign corporation actually con-
sents to being sued by appointing an agent to receive service of process, and service
is made pursuant to the statute. Re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488 (1890) ;
Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 (1878). There may be a problem in such
a situation, however, concerning the scope of the agent's authority, i.e. whether it
extends to causes of action arising in other jurisdictions, or is based solely on
corporate acts within the territory of the forum. See In Morris & Co. v. Scan-
dinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405 (1929) and Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279
U. S. 320 (1929).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.1 and 55-38.2 (Supp. 1955). The activities speci-
fied are set out on p. -, infra.
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957)
and Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
' Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957).
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839), where Chief
Justice Taney stated: "It is very true, that a corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists
only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases
to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. Jt
must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."
' St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882); Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U. S.
(18 How.) 404 (1855).
'Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1897).
"0 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); 23 Am. JUR., Foreign
Corporations § 235 (1939).
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constructed by the courts.' But a foreign corporation had entered a
state (so as to give its "implied consent" to suit) only when it was "doing
business" therein.1 2  And a foreign corporation was not "present" in
the state unless it was "doing business" therein,13 thus the common
criterion. 14
It was early established that state jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion was primarily a question of due process of law, and that a personal
judgment against a defendant, whether individual or corporate, over
whom the court has no jurisdiction, violates the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and is void.'5
The test of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations was analyzed
and overhauled by the United States Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,' which today remains the landmark
case in this field of the law. It has been almost universally cited as
having liberalized, i.e., extended, state jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. This is true notwithstanding the Washington Supreme Court's
having held the corporation subject to suit in the state under the already
well-established rule that "solicitation within a state by the agents of a
foreign corporation plus some additional activities there are sufficient
to render the corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of the
state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities there."'17 In
affirming judgment, the United States Supreme Court nowhere refuted
this basis for the state court's decision. However, the opinion manifests
an obvious intent to overhaul the test for state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, so the fact that it was done by dicta is probably of no
consequence.
"PRESENCE" TEST: DISCARDED OR DISGUISED?
Characterizing the "implied consent" rule as a mere legal fiction' s
and the "presence" test as begging the question,'9 the Court pronounced
"St. Clair v. Cox, 106'U. S. 350 (1882). "Ibid.
" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); Green v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
" It should be noted that there are three degrees of "doing business" for three
different legal purposes: (1) the least degree is that which will permit service of
process in a suit against a foreign corporation; (2) a higher degree is necessary
to subject such a corporation to a tax on its activity; (3) a still higher degree is
the standard for the application of statutes requiring qualification in the state. See
Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018 (1925) ; Travelers
Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950).
Consideration is herein related only to the first of these legal purposes, viz.,
the state's power to serve its process on a foreign., corporation so as to validly
subject it to a judgment ii personain.
"Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
x6326 U. S. 310 (1945). 17Id. at 314.
Is Id. at 318.
" Id. at 317. "To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there as to satisfy
due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits
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a statement which may be said to epitomize the International Shoe doc-
trine: "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "20 The Court's usage of the phrase, "if he be
not present," and its characterization of the "presence" test as begging
the question to be decided apparently furnished the motivation for
courts and commentators to conclude that the International Shoe de-
cision discarded the "presence" test (and its criterion, "doing busi-
ness") .21 This conclusion, even if technically correct, may tend to state
too much. It implies that no longer must a corporation have agents pres-
ent in the state, doing business, as a requisite to its being subject to suit
therein.22 It implies that no longer will courts think in terms of "pres-
ence," and that (since "'presence' of a corporation can be manifested
only by activities of those authorized to act for it") 2a a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to suit in a state wherein not one of its agents ever
set foot. That such an inference may be drawn seems attested to by
statutes such as the one herein considered,24 designed to confer on the
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations not doing business in the
state, and making a basis for jurisdiction such acts as the corporation's
making "any contract . . . in this State," or its repeated solicitation of
business in the state by mail.2 5 The validity of such a statute rests on
the dubious assumption that the "minimum contacts" doctrine of Inter-
national Shoe altogether excludes the necessity of the corporation having
agents physically present in the state asserting jurisdiction.
against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the
terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem, to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process."
" Id. at 316. The case is said to have laid down the test of "minimum' con-
tacts," also referred to in the opinion as "contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 319.
" This is a stock observation of courts and commentators interpreting the
decision. E.g., see Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96
S. E. 2d 445 (1957) ; and Notes, 16 U. CHL L. REv. 523 (1949) and 30 N. C. L.
REv. 454 (1952). This is not to say that the observation is not technically correct,
since, in name, the "presence" test was quite obviously replaced by the "minimum
contacts" test.
"2The fact. that a foreign corporation attempts to withdraw from the state
after having made transactions giving rise to the liability sued on does not affect
the power of the forum to subject the corporation to suit. Washington ex rel.
Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933); Mutual Re-
serve Fund Life Assn. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147 (1903) ; Connecticut Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602 (1899).
28 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316.
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (Supp. 1955).
"-Id., subsection (a), subdivisions (1) and (2). For statutes of other states
similar to the one herein considered, see Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston
Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den., 348 U. S. 943; Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
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It may seem obstinate to argue that the Court did not intend to dis-
pense with presence of the corporation's agents as a requisite to juris-
diction when it flatly stated: "if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts with it . ..."26
But following this statement, the Court cited Milliken v. Meyer,27 from
which was quoted the phrase, "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 28  There, the defendant, an individual domiciled in
Wyoming, was personally served with Wyoming process while in Col-
orado, pursuant to a Wyoming statute authorizing such service. It was
held that the defendant's domicile in Wyoming was a sufficient basis
for the extra-territorial service.
Few would contest a state's jurisdiction over a domestic corpora-
tion, though all its officers, directors, employees, agents, and security
holders be out of the state. Therefore, the statement in International
Shoe, "if he be not present," as applied to a corporation, merely refers
to a foreign corporation, and not necessarily a foreign corporation whose
agents have never been physically present in the state asserting jurisdic-
tion over it. In Milliken v. Meyer, the defendant's domicile in Wyoming
provided the basis for that state's extra-territorial jurisdiction over him.
Since there can be no such basis where a foreign corporation is con-
cerned,29 it seems doubtful that the Court in International Shoe intended
by the statement, "if he be not present," to discard the "presence" theory
to the extent that a state could acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration whose agents have never been physically present in the state. This
doubt is strengthened by the Court's statement that the "presence" of a
corporation can be manifested only by activities of those authorized to
act for it, and that the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely
to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agents "within the
state" (Emphasis added) which courts will deem sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process3 0 Any inference that the Court had ceased to
think in terms of "presence" would seem to be negated by two sentences
in the final paragraph of the opinion: "For Washington has made one of
.11326 U. S. at 316.
27 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
8 The Court in Milliken v. Meyer, supra note 27, had borrowed the terms "fair
play" and "substantial justice" from Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.
90, 91 (1917).
" Except perhaps when a foreign corporation domesticates, but it is extremely
unlikely that the Court had such a situation in mind.
20 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316, 317. Fur-
thermore, it was stated that where a corporate agent is only casually present within
the state or he conducts only single or isolated items of activity, it would lay too
great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process
to require the corporation to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdic-
tion where it carries on more substantial activities.
It would seem non sequitur that since casual presence will not suffice, no
presence will.
1957]
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those activities [viz., employing salesmen within the state], which taken
together establish appellant's [the corporation's] 'presence' there for
purposes of suit, the taxable event by which the state brings appellant
within the reach of its taxing power. . . . The activities which estab-
lish its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to
recover the tax."3'
On first impression, Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia32 appears to
justify the inference that "presence" is no longer a consideration. There,
the defendant mail-order health insurance association, located in Ne-
braska, had for years been issuing insurance certificates to Virginia
residents upon recommendations of Virginia "members." It was held
that Virginia, under its "Blue Sky Law," had power to issue a cease and
desist order to enforce at least the requirement that the defendant consent
to suit against it by service of process on the secretary of state. The
Court's opinion, by Black, J., stated: "But where business activities
reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obliga-
tions with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional
'consent' in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in
the latter state."3 3  Although the defendant had "caused claims to be
investigated,"' 4 it solicited its insurance solely by mail. Thus, it might
appear that "presence" is not essential for jurisdiction. However, five
justices expressed opinions to the contrary. Four of them dissented
because in their opinion: "No agent of the appellant corporation has
entered the State. . . . The contracts were made wholly in Nebraska.
Under these circumstances, I would hold that appellants were never
'present' in Virginia."3  Douglas, J., concurring with the four-man
opinion of the Court by Black, J., expressed the opinion that the Vir-
ginia members of the defendant association were for all practical pur-
poses "agents" of defendant; thus, he found "presence."30  Justice
11Id. at 321. " 339 U. S. 643 (1950).
33 Id. at 647. 34 Id. at 646.
"Id. at 658. Minton, J., writing the dissent, also stated. "As I understand the
International Shoe Co. case, the minimum contacts which a corporation has in the
state must be 'activities of the corporation's agent within the State.'" Id. at 658,
659.
"Id. at 654, 655: "Where the corporate project entails the use of one or more
people in the state for the solicitation of business, in my view it does no violence
to the traditional concept of due process to allow the state to provide protective
measures governing that solicitation."
The seemingly unique treatment reserved for the defendant foreign insurance
corporation is further illustrated by a North Carolina case factually in point with
the Travelers Health case, where the defendant was held to be "doing business"
within the meaning of that term as used in a statute conferring jurisdiction over
foreign insurance companies, the court stating: "The dominant purpose of such a
statute is to protect residents of the State from being imposed upon by foreign
insurance companies. In case any such company offers to ao business with one
within such protection, it holds itself out as having qualified to do such business,
and the resident, in the absence of knowledge, actual or constructive, to the
[Vol. 35
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Douglas also pointed to the wide power of a state by virtue of the
McCarran Act3 7 to exclude an interstate insurance company which re-
fuses to comply with its regulatory laws. 38 Thus, it might be more ac-
curate to cite this case as supporting, rather than opposing, the theory
that a foreign corporation's agents must have been present in the state
for jurisdiction to obtain.
It is not doubted that in International Shoe the "minimum con-
tacts" test was meant to supersede the "presence" test. However, the
change seems to have been one chiefly of terminology.39  On the other
hand, regardless of the Court's intention, the result has been to liberalize
the law, i.e., to give the states wider jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions by requiring less activities of them in the territory of the forum
to subject them to suit there.40  Indeed, the very adoption of the term
"minimum contacts" as the test, with the resultant deemphasis of the
terms "presence" and "doing business," is a semantic indication that less
will now suffice.
CONVENIENCE As A FACTOR
Three factors were deemed weighty in determining whether the for-
eign corporation had established "minimum contacts . .. such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" They were: (1) whether the activities within
the state have been continuous and systematic or only single or isolated ;41
(2) whether or not the activities give rise to the liabilities sued on ;42 and
(3) an estimate of the inconveniences which would result to the corpora-
tion from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business.
4 3
The first two were merely a recognition of factors deemed pertinent in
contrary, may safely act upon the faith thereof." Lunceford v. Commercial
Travelers Mutual Accident Assn., 190 N. C. 314, 129 S. E. 805 (1925), followed
in Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 241 N. C. 483, 85 S. E. 2d 602 (1955), which
cited the Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia and International Shoe cases.
S59 STAT. 33, h. 20, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
"Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. at 652.
"See Tudge Sobeloff's statement to this effect in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). Justice Rutledge, writing the
opinion in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 422 (1946), said that
International Shoe decided that regular and continuous solicitation constitutes "'do-
ing business,' contrary to formerly prevailing notions."
"' See, for example, Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md.
237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den., 348 U. S. 943; Johns v. Bay State Abrasive
Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1950); Smyth v. Twin State Improve-
ment Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
41326 U. S. at 317.
4" Ibid.
" Ibid., quoting L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139,
141 (2d Cir. 1930). No mention was made of the plaintiff's convenience, although
Black, J., alluded to such in his dissent, stating that in his opinion the Constitution
gave the states power "to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corpora-
tions whose agents do business in those States. . . ." Id. at 323.
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earlier decisions, 44 and so well-founded as to need no elaboration here.
The third one, however, constituted a new element of consideration, 4 5
the propriety of which seems arguable. Perhaps it should be noted that
the accuracy in assigning considerations of convenience as underlying the
International Shoe case has been questioned,46 but it appears to have
been only a voice in the wilderness. 47 In fact, the opinion in Travelers
Health Assn. v. Virginia affirms the existence of this consideration and
goes further to bring in a consideration of the local citizens' inconveni-
ence in having to sue the foreign corporation in its home state, likening
the matter to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 48 In the opinion
of Judge Learned Hand, International Shoe holds that in order to de-
termine jurisdiction "the court must balance the conflicting interests in-
volved; i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the action where
it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant; or vice
versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of
'forum non conveniens.' -49
That considerations of mere convenience of the parties are proper
in this jurisdictional issue, and a comparison of these considerations to
forum non conveniens seem highly questionable. One obvious fallacy
appears in the comparison: Forum non conveniens presupposes the de-
fendant's amenability to suit in the forum exercising the doctrine, but if
the forum is not the convenient one it may decline to exercise its juris-
diction ;50o whereas, in the International Shoe type case the very issue is
whether the forum has jurisdiction, and the convenience element is in-
" Ibid., citing the earlier decisions in which these factors were deemed rele-
vant.
However, the Court further stated that the test to determine whether there has
been sufficient activity in the state to subject the foreign corporation to suit there"cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative," but "must depend ,rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion.of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id.
at 319. This "quality and nature" criterion was expressly drawn from the non-
resident motorist situation (Id. at 318, citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160,
Hess. v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, and Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253), thus making
it of dubious value in the ordinary foreign corporation situation where the suit
does not usually rise from an auto accident, or even a tort.
" New, that is, in United States Supreme Court decisions. L. Hand, J., had
injected this element into the picture in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d
139 (2d Cir. 1930), which the Supreme Court relied on considerably in Interna-
tional Shoe, at 316-317.
" Note, 61 HARV. L. Rrv. 1254, 1255 (1948).
" No other commentary or decision taking this position has been discovered.
339 U. S. at 648, 649.
"Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. den. 335
U. S. 814, criticized in Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1254 (1948).
" "Indeed the doctrine of formn non conveniens can never apply if there is
absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 504 (1947). "In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes
into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable




tended to go to the root of the issue of jurisdiction vel non. Moreover,
it seems doubtful that the underlying principles of the two theories are
in harmony. Briefly stated, forum non conveniens is designed to secure
trial in the most appropriate forum from the standpoint of justice for
all parties,51 whereas the International Shoe doctrine is concerned only
with inconvenience to the defendant foreign corporation.52 Of course,
the Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia opinion, by Black, J. (who
vigorously dissented in International Shoe for fear state jurisdiction was
being curtailed) '  injected into the International Shoe doctrine the
additional factor of the plaintiff's convenience.54 It may be wondered
that the two considerations do not cancel each other, since what will be
convenient for one will be inconvenient for the other, and vice versa.
The foreign corporation presents a novelty, its presence in the forum de-
pending as it does upon the activities of those who act for it. But to
condition a state's jurisdiction on the convenience of the defendant (or of
either, or both, parties) is indeed novel. What is to be the result when
convenience is actually no factor, e.g. a New Jersey corporation doing
business in Jersey City, New Jersey, and having only minimal contacts
with the state of New York, being sued in a court in New York City
by a resident thereof. Will the fact that suit in New York City will
work no great inconvenience to the corporation suffice to give the New
York court jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not present, doing
""Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as
to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may
not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant
by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue
his remedy. But unless tire balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. (Emphasis added.)
"Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Admin-
istrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested
centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not
to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litiga-
tion. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding
the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where
they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial
of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 508 (1947).
In the typical International Shoe type case, it is likely that few of these con-
siderations would weigh in the foreign corporation's favor.
'2 326 U. S. at 317. See note 43, supra.
Id. at 323, where Black, J., stated: "It [the Court] has thus introduced un-
certain elements confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise of
State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution."
51339 U. S. at 648, 649.
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
business, in New York? In short, will convenience supply part of the
requisite "minimum contacts ?" If so, then, conversely, considerable in-
convenience to the corporation would result in lack of jurisdiction where
only the barest "minimum [business] contacts" exist.
If the convenience element is designed to secure justice (due
process), it is also designed to defy statutory definition or reasonable
predictability by the parties. Each case must hinge, to some extent at
least, on the distance between the foreign corporation's home or principal
place of business and the court where suit is brought. No reason appears
for showing more concern for the foreign corporation's convenience than
is shown for the individual defendant's convenience.65 As respects due
process, either type of defendant is afforded the most a party should have
a right to expect in the way of demanding another forum, by virtue of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to be exercised in the interests of
a fair trial-not for one party's mere convenience, which must necessarily
be at the inconvenience of his adversary.
INTERNATIONAL SHOE INTERPRETED
Apparently interpreting the International Shoe decision liberally,
the 1955 North Carolina General Assembly enacted General Statute
§ 55-38.1, pertinent parts of which read: "(a) Every foreign corpora-
tion shall be subject to suit in this State, by a resident of this State or
by a person having a usual place of business in this State, whether or not
such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this
State ... on any cause of action arising as follows: . . . (3) Out of the
production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or con-
sumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or
where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold or
whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers; or (4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising
out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of mis-
feasance or nonfeasance."
In Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,56 subdivision (3) of the
above statute was declared unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that
case.57 Defendant foreign corporation published magazines in Phila-
delphia and sold them to eighteen independent wholesale newsdealers in
North Carolina, title passing upon delivery by defendant to the com-
mon carrier in Philadelphia. The magazines were paid for at defend-
ant's Philadelphia or Washington offices, no offices of any kind being
"Apparently, none is shown. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927);
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
r" 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).
6 Id. at 443, 96 S. E. 2d at 454.
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maintained in North Carolina. Some subscriptions were solicited by
mail, but the cause of action did not arise out of such solicitations. Three
sales promotion representatives entered North Carolina, from two to five
times a year each, for purposes of promoting sales to newsdealers and
television dealers. Plaintiff's alleged cause of action was for libel and
invasion of privacy as a result of an article appearing in one of de-
fendant's magazifies.
It was held that the defendant had no "contacts, ties, or relations
with North Carolina, so as to make it amenable to service of process from
the Courts of the State for the purpose of a judgment in personam
against it. The occasional visits of agents of the defendant .. , are not
deemed sufficient to render the defendant liable to suit in the State
Courts. Upon all the facts found by the judge, he correctly concluded
that defendant has not transacted or done business in the State. .... ,,58
The case of Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,59 was dis-
tinguished on grounds indistinguishable from the "presence" theory;
thus: "In that case the defendant was in the State of Vermont and
committed the tort in the state."'60 Although International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington was quoted extensively61 and Travelers Health
Ass'n. v. Virginia was cited,6 2 no attempt was made to base the de-
cision on inconvenience to the corporation; indeed, the convenience
factor was not even adverted to.
The Court cited with approval the recent case of Erlanger Mills,
Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,63 where it was held that subdivision
(3) of the same statute64 may not validly subject a foreign corporation
not doing business in North Carolina to the jurisdiction of the state for
a breach of warranty action arising from a single sale consummated in
New York "with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be
used or consumed in [North Carolina] and are so used or consumed.
65
Sobeloff, J., writing the Erlanger Mills opinion, perceived that, "Though
the 'minimum contact' theory may have liberalizing tendencies, it was
not so much an innovation on due process as it was a rephrasing of the
'11Id. at 441, 96 S. E. 2d at 453, citing the International Shoe case. The Court
interpreted the word "goods" as used in the statute to include "magazines," and was
also of the opinion that the alleged tort was not committed in North Carolina,
hence subdivision (4) of G. S. 55-38.1 (a), making "tortious conduct" in the state
a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising therefrom, was held not applicable. But
the Court stated that if subdivision (4) were applicable, it "would raise a serious
question as to its constitutionality." Id. at 444, 96 S. E. 2d at 455.
(' 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951), where defendant foreign corporation was
held subject to suit in Vermont for alleged negligent re-roofing of plaintiff's house
there.
" 245 N. C. at 443, 444, 96 S. E. 2d at 454.
11 Id. at 438, 439. 62 Id. at 439.
"239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (3) (Supp. 1955).
"239 F. 2d at 505, quoting a portion of the statute, smpra note 64.
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
prevailing fictional tests, in order more properly to describe the judicial
methodology long employed. 60
In dismissing the contention that a visit of one of the corporation's
agents to North Carolina to attempt to compromise the controversy was
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, Judge Sobeloff clearly indicated that
courts still think in terms of "presence": "This incidental and ephem-
eral presence of the [corporation's] agent is not the equivalent of
the presence of the [corporation], and it is to be remembered that it
is the [corporation's] 'presence'--a term that symbolizes adequate con-
tacts-that is needed to make it amenable to suit in North Carolina.
So also 'contacts' is not to be understood in the most literal sense, as
though the law's requirement is satisfied by a foot-fall on the State's
soil. The word refers to the relationship through activity deemed sub-
stantial. '67 If, as Judge Sobeloff states, "presence" is a term that sym-
bolizes "adequate contacts," which is presumably synonomous with "min-
imum contacts," then International Shoe truly represents only a change
of nomenclature.
Apart from the value of Judge Sobeloff's statements as interpretive of
the International Shoe doctrine, they are significant as a reflection of
the judicial inclination, or perhaps desire, to think in terms of "pres-
ence" when applying the "minimum contacts" test.68 It also seems
significant that the corporation's inconvenience in having to defend a suit
in North Carolina was not mentioned as a reason for denying jurisdic-
tion.6 9 Apparently, it would have made little difference if the contract
sued upon had been consummated in North Carolina rather than in New
York, because "the place of execution and performance of the contract
are not alone decisive."70 Further, there was a strong intimation that
no jurisdiction would have existed even had the plaintiff's cause of
action been in tort.
71
00 Id. at 506.
"7 Id. at 509." Cf. In Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107
A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 943, where a foreign corporation not regu-
larly doing business in Maryland was held subject to suit there under a statute
conferring jurisdiction over such corporations on a cause of action arising on a
contract made in the State, whether or iot the corporation was doing business there.
However, the contract was for the purchase of ships lying in Maryland waters;
defendant's president came into Maryland to negotiate the contract and inspect the
ships; defendant, by the terms of the contract, had deposited money in escrow in
Baltimore, and was required to comply with certain requirements of the state mari-
time commission.
" judge Sobeloff stated that, "The question to begin with is whether there is
legal power in the State's courts over the corporation." 239 F. 2d at 509.
"Id. at 505. This throws doubt on the validity of subdivision (1) of G. S.
55-38.1 (a), which confers jurisdiction for causes of action arising "Out of any
contract made in this State or to be performed in this State."
"' "We are not persuaded by the argument that jurisdiction should be sustained
because it is said there would be jurisdiction if the suit were for a tort arising
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where the corporation's activity in the state is tortious, however, the
courts are more inclined to take a liberal view of the state's jurisdiction.
In Painter v. Home Finance Co.,72 the defendant foreign corporation was
held subject to local jurisdiction where its agent apparently entered
the state for the sole purpose of repossessing plaintiff's automobile, re-
sulting in plaintiff's suit for wrongful taking of property, invasion of
privacy, unlawful public threats of duress, and mental and physical
suffering resulting therefrom. Jurisdiction was upheld under subdivision
(4) of G. S. 55-38.1 (a), which provides for service of process on foreign
corporations "not transacting business in this State" for any cause of
action arising out of "tortious conduct in this State.
'73
The trial court's finding that defendant's activity (including perhaps
the fact that its president resided in North Carolina) constituted "doing
business" in the state was expressly held unnecessary and treated as
surplusage since the statute does not require such. The brief opinion
made no reference to Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,7 4 decided
earlier the same month, where the Court had held subdivision (3) of the
same statute unconstitutional and expressed doubt as to the consti-
tutionality of subdivision (4).75
Painter v. Home Finance Co., now stands alongside Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp.,7 a Vermont decision, in holding that the
commission of a tort by a foreign corporation's agents physically present
in the state subjects the corporation to suit therein based on the tort.
Although the corporate activity in these cases was not "continuous and
systematic, '77 its giving rise to the liabilities sued on,78 taken with a
due regard for its nature and quality79 (tortious), probably justifies juris-
diction under the International Shoe doctrine.
from the transaction between the parties rather than for a breach of contract.
Appellant's [plaintiff's] premise, that there would be jurisdiction if the case were
one in tort is without authoritative support." Id. at 507.
-2245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957).
7' See p. 554, supra, where pertinent parts of the statute are set out.
7, See note 56, supra.
See note 58, supra.
7 See note 59, supra. Also see Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1950), where defendant, having made a substantial
number of sales in the state and having an agent for solicitation therein, was held
subject to Maryland jurisdiction in a tort action, although its activity there was
held not to be "doing business." In Hall v. Flintkote Co., 139 F. Supp. 32 (D. C.
Md. 1956), defendant was held to be "doing business" where it employed in the
state two sales representatives to whom it furnished letterheads, these agents
making inspections to see that defendant's products were being properly installed
on jobs, and having desk space with a local distributor; defendant also had a tele-
phone listing showing its distributor's address, and it guaranteed roofing projects
in which its products were used.
" International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 317.
78 Ibid.
" Id. at 319. See note 44, supra.
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CONCLUSION
These recent decisions contrast two schools of interpretation of the
International Shoe doctrine: On the one hand are the state legislatures,
seeking maximum jurisdiction in the interests of local residents by de-
fining "minimum contacts" in such terms as "any contract made in this
State,"8' 0 or the repeated solicitation of business in this State by mail or
otherwise,8 or the distribution of goods with the "reasonable expecta-
tion" that they will be used in this state and are so used,82 or "tortious
conduct" in this state,83 provided the suit against the foreign corporation
arises out of such "contacts. '8 4 On the other hand are the courts, re-
fusing to accept these definitions when it is thought they will "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"8 5 yet accepting
them when they are thought not to so offend.
It has been observed that by granting to the judiciary the power to
determine what is "fair play" or "substantial justice" sets up the courts
as policy-making bodies.8 6 There is no argument here. The question
is, what is the policy? And what is it to be tomorrow? From what has
gone before, these observations seem justified: (1) Since International
Shoe, the trend is clearly toward broader state jurisdiction; (2) how-
ever, there is a marked tendency to require physical presence of the
'agents of the corporation in the state before subjecting it to suit therein;
and (3) the forum's inconvenience to the parties is sometimes deemed
a factor but is of dubious pertinence; (4) although in the desire to secure
a fair trial the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be seemingly in-
correctly applied. It may be expected that, in the future, the "presence"
and "convenience" factors will decline in importance, resulting in even
broader state jurisdiction, with the forum non conveniens doctrine avail-
able as a safeguard against injustice to the foreign corporation.
FREDERICK A. BABSON, JR.
Taxation-Marital Deduction-Life Insurance Proceeds and the
Terminable Interest Rule
In the Internal Revenue Act of 19481 Congress repealed the 1942
community property amendments, 2 and added the now familiar marital
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (1) (Sup p. 1955).
1Id., subdivision (2). "Id., subdivsion (3).
":Id., subdivision (4). "Id., subsection (a).
"International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316.
"Note, 20 TUL. L. REv. 437, 439 (1946). Justice Black, dissenting in the
International Shoe case, 326 U. S. at 323, stated: "I think it a judicial depriva-
tion to condition its exercise [state jurisdiction] upon this Court's notion of 'fair
play,' however appealing that term may be."
'INT. REV. AcT OF 1948, 62 STAT. 110 (1948).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, Sec. 811, as amended 62 STAT. 116 (1948).
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